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Based on the frameworks of dual-process theories, we examined the interplay between
intuitive and controlled cognitive processes related to moral and social judgments. In a
virtual reality (VR) setting we performed an experiment investigating the progression from
fast, automatic decisions towards more controlled decisions over multiple trials in the
context of a sacrificing scenario. We repeatedly exposed participants to a modified ten-
to-one version and to three one-to-one versions of the trolley dilemma in VR and varied
avatar properties, such as their gender and ethnicity, and their orientation in space. We also
investigated the influence of arousing music on decisions. Our experiment replicated the
behavioral pattern observed in studies using text versions of the trolley dilemma, thereby
validating the use of virtual environments in research on moral judgments. Additionally,
we found a general tendency towards sacrificing male individuals which correlated with
socially desirable responding. As indicated by differences in response times, the ten-to-
one version of the trolley dilemma seems to be faster to decide than decisions requiring
comparisons based on specific avatar properties as a result of differing moral content.
Building upon research on music-based emotion induction, we used music to induce
emotional arousal on a physiological level as measured by pupil diameter. We found a
specific temporal signature displaying a peak in arousal around the moment of decision.
This signature occurs independently of the overall arousal level. Furthermore, we found
context-dependent gaze durations during sacrificing decisions, leading participants to look
prolonged at their victim if they had to choose between avatars differing in gender. Our
study confirmed that moral decisions can be explained within the framework of dual-
process theories and shows that pupillometric measurements are a promising tool for
investigating affective responses in dilemma situations.
Keywords: virtual reality, decision-making, trolley dilemma, gender, eye-tracking, emotion induction, arousal,
affective responses
INTRODUCTION
Moral judgments are central to social behavior. We constantly
assess our and other’s behavior in moral terms and adjust our
actions to what we and our social environment consider to
be morally right. In recent years there has been an increasing
interest in cognitive and social sciences regarding the cognitive
and emotional processes underlying moral judgments. Research
in social cognitive psychology provides strong evidence that moral
judgments are often driven by quick, automatic, and affectively
tinged intuitions (e.g., Fiske et al., 1999; Haidt, 2001), while it
is also acknowledged that contextual factors determine whether
automatic emotional responses or controlled cognitive responses
prevail in a given situation (e.g., Greene et al., 2001). Usually these
judgment mechanisms are investigated by letting participants
respond to construed moral dilemmas. These dilemma situations
can be divided into personal and impersonal dilemmas based on
the level of personal involvement (Greene et al., 2001). While
personal dilemmas involve the immediate application of force
(e.g., pushing an overweight man off a bridge in order to stop
a trolley from colliding with five people), impersonal dilemmas
do not involve direct physical contact and are therefore rather
remote interactions (such as changing the direction of a trolley
from the distance by pushing a lever and thereby sacrificing one
person in order to save five). The primary objective of the present
study is to validate the use of immersive virtual reality (VR)
technology in moral dilemma studies by replicating the results
obtained in previous studies using textual presentations of the
trolley dilemma. In the following paragraphs we will summarize
the past research on the trolley dilemma, explain the benefits of
employing virtual environments, and elaborate in more detail
on the rationale for our study, including our use of additional
measurements (eye-tracking and pupillometry) as well as the
employment of additional experimental conditions (one-against-
one-dilemmas).
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The trolley dilemma was originally devised as a philosophical
thought experiment (Foot, 1978; Thomson, 1985) and has since
been utilized in various psychological studies to shed light on
moral judgment and decision-making (e.g., Greene et al., 2001,
2004; Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Hauser et al., 2007). In
the original version of this dilemma, one is asked to imagine
someone driving a trolley headed for five people standing on
tracks who will be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present
course. It is not possible to stop the trolley, but it can be
turned onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one
person instead of five (Foot, 1978). Thomson (1985) developed
a modified version of the dilemma in which one is not the
driver of the trolley but a bystander standing near the tracks
who has the opportunity to hit a switch in order to turn the
trolley. The question in both versions is whether it is morally
right to turn the trolley. Researchers such as Greene (2008)
consider the trolley dilemma to be a paradigmatic case in which
cognitive responses predominate due to the impersonal nature
of the situation. Impersonal dilemmas lead most people to exert
a utilitarian (or, more broadly, consequentialist) judgment: they
tend to bring about the best overall consequences at the cost
of the well-being of single individuals. Several psychological
studies using variants of this dilemma have shown that a vast
majority of people tend to endorse the alternative conforming
to utilitarianism, i.e., they sacrifice one person to save five (e.g.,
Valdesolo and DeSteno, 2006; Hauser et al., 2007). However,
in comparable personal dilemma situations that require direct
physical force to sacrifice the single person, people tend to be
more passive and let the five people die. As an explanation,
Greene proposes a dual-process theory according to which both
automatic emotional responses and more controlled cognitive
responses play crucial roles in moral judgments (Greene, 2008;
Greene et al., 2008). More specifically, he argues that utilitarian
moral judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes
while non-utilitarian judgments are driven by automatic emo-
tional responses. The trolley dilemma predominantly triggers
controlled processes, while dilemmas involving the application
of direct physical force trigger affective responses in a stronger
manner.
Previous research on moral decisions within the trolley
paradigm has been primarily carried out using written scenario
descriptions (sometimes supplemented by an image depicting
the scene). This has led to the negligence of important dynamic
situational and emotional aspects of this dilemma. A written and
static version of the scenario will most likely not feature any
dynamics in visual presentation that elicit emotional arousal. This
not only applies for pen-and-paper versions but also for fMRI
studies investigating the trolley dilemma (e.g., Greene et al., 2001;
Harenski and Hamann, 2006). Accordingly, Patil et al. (2014)
emphasized that “the advantage of relying on text- or graphic-
based questionnaires is its great experimental controllability, but
the downside is that it greatly simplifies the issue at hand by
removing all the nonessential contextual features of the dilemmas,
raising issue of generalizability of the obtained results” (p. 95).
Hence, previous studies could have systematically overestimated
cognitive processes compared to emotional ones (cf. Bzdok et al.,
2012). Furthermore, most previous studies included only one
trial, thus leading to a one-shot study design that fails to measure
within-subject changes in moral decisions due to repeated pre-
sentations and possible influences of explicit rationalization after
having made a decision. A recent study by Friedman et al. (2014)
showed that repeated presentations of identical moral scenarios
are a suitable approach to investigate potential changes in decision
making processes. Despite producing clear results, questionnaire
studies only offer a very low degree of immersion. Moreover, cur-
rent theories of cognition stress the importance of situative and
contextual factors (Niedenthal et al., 2005). All of these shortcom-
ings can be remedied by using a VR version of the trolley dilemma.
An emerging trend in social cognition research is to conduct
experiments using VR technology in order to elicit more real-
istic experiences (Bunge and Skulmowski, 2014). The types of
thoughts and emotions that would be evoked in real life are likely
to be generated during the experiment, proving the ecological
validity of this method (Rovira et al., 2009). Virtual reality allows
us to conduct experiments that would be ethically unacceptable
to execute in non-virtual environments. Several studies have
shown that participants’ subjective, behavioral, and physiological
responses in VR environments map their behavior and experience
in real world settings, such as in the VR replication of Milgram’s
(1963) obedience experiment by Slater et al. (2006). When the
interaction possibilities mirror real actions, virtual environments
provide a feeling of immersion or presence (Carassa et al., 2005).
Furthermore, additional equipment can be linked to the VR
device in order to record physiological measures of emotional
arousal.
Following a pilot study by Pan and Slater (2011), a study by
Navarrete et al. (2012) was the first attempt to use the trolley
dilemma in a VR setting for moral cognition research. In this
study, each participant was standing on a platform overhanging
a railway track splitting up into two tracks. Directly in front
of the participant there was a rail switch enabling participants
to lead a boxcar rushing down the main track onto the side
track. Participants had to decide whether they want to change
the direction of the boxcar in order to save a group of virtual
persons (avatars) on one track by sacrificing a single avatar on
another track. In accordance with a previous large-scale pen-
and-paper study (Hauser et al., 2007), Navarrete et al. (2012)
found that 90% of the participants endorsed the utilitarian out-
come. However, this study suffers from various limitations. Most
importantly, it only featured a one-shot study design similar
to most previous studies, making the investigation of potential
changes in moral decisions across repeated scenario presenta-
tions impossible. Additionally, we found the course of action
in the virtual environment to be unnecessarily confusing since
the avatars were not visible at the time that the boxcar arrives.
Furthermore, participants were bystanders observing the scene,
leading to an impersonal version of the scenario that usually
elicits low emotional responses (Greene et al., 2001). However,
it has to be acknowledged that using the impersonal version of
the trolley dilemma in VR does lead to considerable emotional
engagement. Navarrete et al. (2012) and Patil et al. (2014) showed
that emotional engagement in a moral dilemma significantly
benefits from the increased degree of immersion elicited by
VR.
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The present study builds on Navarrete et al. (2012) study and
implements several improvements. Instead of our participants
being passive bystanders watching the scene from a distance, they
were the drivers of the train. Because research on user experiences
in VR revealed that a first-person view elicit an even higher
involvement and a higher sense of spatial presence than a third-
person view as realized by Navarrete et al. (cf. Kallinen et al.,
2007), we introduced this change of perspective. Hence, although
this change of perspective does not involve the immediate appli-
cation of force, i.e., a haptic component that is characteristic
for personal versions of moral dilemmas and leads to strong
emotional responses (cf. Greene et al., 2001), being the driver of
the trolley instead of merely seeing the scene from a distance was
expected to elicit strong emotional responses as well. Moreover, in
contrast to previous studies on the trolley dilemma, we wanted to
examine the effect of being repeatedly confronted with a dilemma
situation to investigate behavioral changes over time. Two recent
VR studies have let participants make moral decisions repeatedly
(Friedman et al., 2014; Patil et al., 2014), though they varied
the context of the decision (e.g., substituting the trolley with
a number of other ways to put virtual people in danger). We
chose to present our participants repeatedly with instances of
the same dilemma in one session. The response patterns elicited
through the repeated presentation of a dilemma reveal possible
rationalization processes that occur after a decision has been
made. Moreover, they can be used to test assumptions of dual-
process models of attitude-guided behavior (Olson and Fazio,
2009). While the first few confrontations with a dilemma should
lead to rather spontaneous and automatic responses, during the
course of the experiment participants have the necessary time
to reflect upon their decision tendencies in an elaborated and
controlled manner. Unlike in the usual pen-and-paper studies,
these patterns can be investigated in the realistic setting that
VR provides. Lastly, although we consider the measurement of
arousal via electrodermal activity by Navarrete et al. (2012) to be
a good first step, we chose to introduce pupillometry to moral
cognition research due to its finer temporal resolution. At the
same time, the use of eye tracking equipment allows us to analyze
participants’ gaze behavior. Virtual reality equipment also enables
the exact and constant timing of decision time frames as well
as the measurement of response times, unlike pen-and-paper
studies.
Despite these differences in the study design, the strong
tendency that participants exhibited in previous studies led us
to hypothesize that participants will sacrifice the single person
instead of the group independently of how often they were already
confronted with the dilemma (hypothesis 1). By replicating and
extending the finding that participants tend to act utilitarian in
trolley dilemma situations, we also aim to validate our paradigm
to use repeated dilemma confrontations from the trolley driver’s
perspective in a fully dynamic VR environment.
Virtual reality equipment also enables the presentation and
synchronized recording of reactions to other stimuli such as music
within the dynamic virtual environment. Seidel and Prinz (2013)
showed that negative emotions such as anger, annoyance, and
irritation can be induced by playing harsh noise and that this
manipulation impacts moral judgments. We hypothesized that
annoying noise might also influence people’s moral behavior
and people’s assessment of their own behavior. A higher arousal
induced by a state of anger, we assumed, might lead to a tendency
towards killing more avatars as a way of relieving frustration
(hypothesis 2), as state hostility has been shown to correlate with
frustration in the context of video game aggression (Anderson
and Dill, 2000).
For the three other conditions of the experiment, we intro-
duced a forced-choice one-against-one modification of the trolley
dilemma. This decision task occurred at rail junctions at which
participants could choose whether to direct the trolley onto
the left or right rail (one target person per rail). In this sense,
utilitarian judgments such as in the classical trolley dilemma are
no longer possible. Instead, specific features of the individual
target persons become the basis for moral decisions. Building
upon research on attitudes towards gender and ethnic outgroups,
we varied the gender of the two persons on the rails and, in
another condition, the skin color of the targets. On various
implicit measures, people usually show more positive attitudes
towards females than towards males (Fazio and Olson, 2003).
This is clearly the case for women, but even men, who might be
expected to show stronger positive attitudes to their own group,
show, if at all, only a minor preference for men (e.g., Nosek
and Banaji, 2001; Richeson and Ambady, 2001; Rudman and
Goodwin, 2004). Accordingly, we expected that at least our female
participants would lean towards sacrificing the male avatar in
the first meaningful trial (i.e., a trial involving avatars) of the
gender condition, when the dilemma has not been encountered
before (hypothesis 3). As for ethnicity, whites show generally
more positive automatic attitudes towards whites than towards
blacks (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995; Dovidio et al., 1997; Greenwald
et al., 1998; Nosek and Banaji, 2001). In a VR setting, Dotsch
and Wigboldus (2008) found that native Dutch participants on
average kept more distance towards avatars with a Moroccan
appearance compared to avatars with a white appearance. We
therefore expected that our white participants will exhibit a
tendency towards sacrificing the dark skinned avatar at least
in the first trial, when the dilemma content is still a surprise
(hypothesis 4). Various studies also utilized more explicit mea-
sures like basic self-reports, semantic differentials, or feeling
thermometers (e.g., Eagly and Mladinic, 1989; Greenwald et al.,
1998; Rudman and Goodwin, 2004). Here the findings are not
univocal, but there is a general trend among explicit measures
to express positive attitudes both towards ingroup members
and outgroup members. A dissociation between implicit atti-
tudes and self-reported attitudes is most likely to be observed
for socially sensitive issues (Dovidio et al., 1997) and is well
explained by the MODE model (Fazio, 1990; Fazio and Olson,
2003; Olson and Fazio, 2009). The acronym MODE stands for
motivation and opportunity as determinants for the attitude-
behavior relationship. If the opportunity (e.g., sufficient time)
and motivation (e.g., concern about evaluation by others) is
given, people reflect on their attitudes and control their response.
Hence, we should observe a shift from an initial spontaneous
categorization towards socially accepted responses over the course
of multiple trials. Other psychological models like the motivated
tactician metaphor (Schwarz, 1998) and the continuum model
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(Fiske et al., 1999) would predict a similar outcome. As the
gender and ethnicity conditions involve socially sensitive issues,
we expected that participants would be motivated not to show
socially inacceptable behavior. Accordingly, we hypothesized that
our participants would deliberately balance the amount of males
and females as well as the amount of blacks and whites that
they sacrifice over the course of the trials (hypotheses 5 and 6,
respectively).
For exploratory reasons, we also included an experimen-
tal condition in which participants had to choose between
sacrificing a person facing away from them and a person
facing toward them in which the avatar facing away from
them was just a double of the avatar gazing at them that
had been rotated by 180◦ along its longitudinal axis. As face
recognition and eye contact are hard-wired cognitive building
blocks of social interactions (Emery, 2000), we expected that
participants would have fewer scruples about sacrificing the
avatar facing away from them than the avatar looking at them
(hypothesis 7).
The alternatives in the group dilemma are more obvious (a
single avatar vs. a group of avatars) than in situations in which
the decision is based on avatar features (male vs. female, black vs.
white, and facing vs. facing away). Accordingly, we hypothesized
that the response times in the group dilemma would be shorter
than in all other dilemmas (hypothesis 8).
Moreover, based on research on pupil diameter change during
decision-making (Simpson and Hale, 1969), we hypothesized that
there will be a specific time signature displaying a peak in arousal
around the moment of decision (hypothesis 9).
Furthermore, studies on the influence of emotionally valenced
sounds on pupil diameter (Partala and Surakka, 2003) suggest
that our music condition will lead to a greater pupil size as a result
of a higher emotional arousal (hypothesis 10).
Finally, gaze behavior in relation to sacrificing decisions in the
trolley dilemma has already been investigated in pen-and-paper
studies (Kastner, 2010). Kastner found that people avoid looking
at pictures of the sacrificed individuals. Accordingly, we expected
that participants will avert their gaze from the virtual avatars that
they chose to sacrifice (hypothesis 11).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-six students (36 female) participated for course credits or
payment. The study was described as an experiment concerning
decisions in dilemma situations. Ages ranged from 18–30 years
with a mean of 21.97 (SD = 2.31). To check for possible
influences of video game consumption, we asked participants
how long they play video games in a post-test questionnaire.
On average, participants played video games for 1.92 (SD =
4.32) hours per week and 1.21 (SD = 2.99) of these hours
were spent on video games in which they kill virtual persons,
showing that our participants are within the range of people
without addictive or other problem video game use (Porter
et al., 2010). They had normal or corrected-to-normal visual
acuity and were naive to the purpose of the study. Due to
pupil recognition problems and shifts of the head-mounted
display (HMD), we could analyze the eye tracking recordings
of only 41 participants. The present study conformed to the
Code of Ethics of the American Psychological Association, to
the Declaration of Helsinki, and to national guidelines. Writ-
ten, informed consent was obtained from all participants. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the University of
Osnabrück.
STIMULI AND DESIGN
During the experiment, participants were seated in the cockpit
of a virtual trolley that was controllable at a rail junction using
the arrow keys on a keyboard. In the gender dilemma, one track
branched off to the left and another track branched off to the
right at the junction. On the middle track, right behind the
junction, a train was blocking the track. The participants’ task
in this experiment was to avoid a collision with the other train
by steering the trolley either onto the left or right track at the
junction. A female and a male agent were standing on the two
branching tracks. The virtual world in this experiment consisted
of a tunnel with a rail track and a gravel ground. We used
a tunnel to make the two avatars appear on screen at a fixed
time.
In condition 1, each participant was presented with 10 fixed
pairs of men and women in a randomized order. The number
of trials in which the female and the male avatar were standing
on a particular side was counterbalanced within participants. In
order to prevent habituation to the decision-task, each condition
contained 10 filler trials without avatars. We used the filler trials
as a means to reduce the predictability of the trials in order
to avoid eliciting thoughtless responses from participants. The
sequence of meaningful trials and fillers was randomized for
each participant. We included additional experimental conditions
in which the avatars differed in ethnicity (condition 2) as well
as a condition in which participants had to choose between
sacrificing a person facing away from them and a person facing
toward them (condition 3). These conditions used the same
environment as the gender condition. In the group condition
(condition 4), participants were presented with a slightly differ-
ent setup, one directly based on the original trolley dilemma:
there was no other train to avoid on the track on which the
trolley was driving and only one alternative track to steer the
trolley towards. In a counterbalanced manner, this alternative
track was either to the right or to the left to the track on which
the trolley was driving initially in each trial. On the middle
track, a group of 10 avatars was presented at the same time
as a single avatar standing on another track (either to the left
or to the right). To control the exact time of stimulus onset,
distance fog was used to hide the avatars from view and make
them appear grayed out for the first second of the presentation
in order to prevent judgments based on individual properties
of the avatars instead of their number. We chose to use 10
avatars instead of the usually used five people based on pre-
tests in order to make sure that participants see at least five
avatars even though the distance fog may obscure parts of the
avatars.
Based on Seidel and Prinz (2013), the group dilemma was also
used to explore the influence of music-induced emotional states
on decision making, i.e., an increase in anger and frustration
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FIGURE 1 | Overview of the experimental sequence in conditions 1–3.
that will lead to a tendency to sacrifice the group. Furthermore,
we tested whether the induction of negative emotions leads to
a different assessment of participants’ own decisions. We used
the harsh and dissonant soundtrack Inner Mind Mystique I by
Yamazaki “Maso” (Takushi (1996), track 1), which has been
shown to elicit negatively valenced emotions. In the 10 meaning-
ful trials of this condition, a fixed group of 10 avatars appearing
in the middle were accompanied by 1 of 10 avatars not included
in that group appearing alone on another track in a randomized
order. As before, 10 filler trials alternated in random order with
the meaningful trials.
APPARATUS AND SETUP
Participants were tested individually, and were seated in a dark-
ened room containing two Dell Precision T7500 workstations
used for stimulus presentation and eye tracking control. The
virtual world was presented on an NVIS nVisor SX60 binoc-
ular HMD at a resolution of 1280 × 1024 at 60 Hz. Eye
position and pupil dilation of the left eye were measured at a
sampling rate of 60 Hz using a monocular ASL EYE-TRAC®
6000 eye tracker with a resolution of 0.25◦ visual angle. To
calibrate, participants fixated on a grid of nine calibration
points presented on the HMD. Presentation of the virtual world
was performed using the Vizard VR Software Toolkit. The
viewpoint had a field of view of 40◦. Head-tracking was not
used in order to be able to record and analyze eye tracking
data.
PROCEDURE
Upon arrival, participants were first informed about the content
and course of the experiment and had to sign an informed
consent form acknowledging the right of the participant to end
the experiment at any time without any negative consequences. It
was pointed out that the experiment involves decisions in social
dilemma situations that pertain to the well-being of virtual per-
sons and that music could be played during the experiment. After
sitting down, getting the HMD adjusted to their head dimensions
and completing the calibration process described above, partici-
pants provided demographic and personal information (age, sex,
and handedness), were handed a keyboard and were presented
with detailed instructions for condition 1 to 3 in German (English
translation follows):
“In the following, you will be the operator of a trolley filled
with passengers. You are approaching another fully occupied
trolley that has come to a halt behind a junction. Your task is to
avoid a serious collision.
You cannot stop the trolley, but you can steer it to the
left or right at the junction if you react quickly enough. To
change the direction of the trolley, push the arrow key of
the corresponding direction. A beep sound will indicate when
pressing the button is effective. You only have a limited time
frame available. Once you have pushed a button, this decision
is irreversible and the trolley will change to the corresponding
track.
Press the space bar to proceed”.
The experiment started with six learning trials in which the
participants learned the controls and were able to familiarize
themselves with the timing. No avatars were present in these
trials. Next, the experimental conditions began. The order of
conditions 1 to 3 (using avatars of differing gender, ethnicity,
and body orientation) was randomized. Each condition consisted
of a randomized sequence of 10 meaningful trials that featured
avatars and 10 filler trials without avatars. Every trial contained
the same sequence of events (see Figure 1): first, participants had
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to start the trial and accept the continuation of the experiment by
pressing the space bar. Then the participant was driving through
the tunnel with a constant speed of 72 km/h. The distance from
the train’s initial position to the junction’s origin was approxi-
mately 135 m. 4.3 s after the beginning of the trial a beep sound
occurred, signaling to the participant that key presses would
now be effective. In meaningful trials, simultaneous to the beep
sound the avatars standing on the left and right branch became
visible. Viewed from the origin of the junction, they were placed
7 m to the left and right and 58.5 m ahead. 2.5 s after the
beep sound, the train reached the junction, meaning that the
participants had to press the left or right arrow key within this
period in order to steer the train onto one of the side tracks.
The short time interval requires a fast decision without elaborated
thinking about the options. The time interval is sufficiently long
to allow for responses that are not merely anticipatory, but is
too short for an elaborated decision process—at least during
the first trial(s). Pre-tests have shown that participants were
unable to reliably recognize the avatar properties in a shorter
time frame. Right before the collision with the avatars, 8 s after
the onset of the trial, the screen was blackened and stayed black
for 2 s. In case no response was given, a message stating that
they have collided with the other trolley was displayed, signaling
an invalid trial. Invalid trials were not repeated in order to
keep the time course of the experiment comparable between
subjects.
After finishing the first three conditions, participants took a
short break. Since the group dilemma (ten-to-one, condition 4)
utilized a slightly different task and environment, all participants
were shown new instructions. As this experiment also featured
a music-induced emotion manipulation, it was always presented
as the last part. Those participants who were assigned to the
music condition could hear the irritating music starting from
the moment that the new instructions were displayed. Again,
six learning trials followed in which no avatars were present.
These trials enabled participants to acknowledge the possibil-
ity of not steering the trolley by not pushing any button and
thereby driving straight ahead. Other than the lack of a tun-
nel and having only one branching track, the procedure and
controls remained the same as for the previous experimental
conditions. In the meaningful trials, the group was standing
58.5 m ahead of the junction’s origin. The single person was
located either 7 m to the right or to the left of the group (see
Figure 2).
Participants in the music condition heard the irritating track
for at least 1 min before having to make their first decision
involving avatars. After completing the questionnaire described
in the following paragraph, participants were debriefed, paid and
thanked. The entire session including the calibration of the eye
tracker lasted 45 min on average, of which 20 min were used for
the VR part.
QUESTIONNAIRE
Following the VR part of the experiment, participants had to
fill out a questionnaire designed to assess their emotional state,
their explicit attitudes towards women, men, blacks and whites,
as well as the amount of (violent) video games they play. In
FIGURE 2 | Screen shortly after the avatars on the rails appeared.
addition, participants completed the SES-17 test (Stöber, 1999,
2001) to measure their tendency towards giving socially desirable
responses.
In order to investigate whether music can be used to induce
emotions within VR experiments, we included the manipulation
check introduced in Seidel and Prinz (2013). It consisted of four
negatively valenced emotional states (angry, irritated, annoyed,
and gross). To further test the effect of music, we also included
a positively valenced emotion term (delighted). Following Seidel
and Prinz (2013), we asked participants to indicate what kind
of emotions they are experiencing “right now.” For each of the
five items, they had to respond on a scale ranging from “very
little felt” (1) to “very strongly felt” (7). To see whether the
music-induced emotional state leads to a stricter judgment of
their decisions during the experiment, participants were asked
how satisfied they are with the decisions they made in the last
condition on a scale ranging from “very satisfied” (1) to “very
unsatisfied” (7).
In order to assess participants’ explicit attitudes towards
women, men, whites, and blacks we followed Eagly and Mladinic
(1989) in using semantic differential scales. Participants were
asked to rank each attitude object on five 7-point scales, with
the dimensions good-bad, positive-negative, valuable-useless,
pleasant-unpleasant, and nice-awful. Each scale was scored from
+3 to −3 and attitudes were represented by each participant’s
mean response on the five scales. Cronbach’s α exceeded 0.80 for
each attitude object.
To check for the influence of excessive consumption of violent
video games, participants were asked how many hours per week
they play video or computer games and how many hours of this
time are used to play games in which virtual people are killed.
Moreover, in order to measure the tendency of participants
towards responding in a socially desirable manner, we included
the SES-17 test consisting of 16 self-referred statements (α
= 0.64) like “In traffic I am always polite and considerate of
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others” (Stöber, 1999, 2001). Participants had to indicate for each
statement whether it is true or false.
MEASUREMENT AND PREPROCESSING OF PUPILLARY DATA AND GAZE
DURATION
Analysis of pupillary data was performed on the time interval
between the beginning of the beep sound (= t1, coinciding
with the appearance of the avatars) and the collision with the
avatar (= t2). Raw eye tracking data was processed by automat-
ically detecting blinks and removing the resulting artifacts. This
was accomplished by discarding the eye tracking data 100 ms
before and after a pupil diameter of 0 mm (indicating a blink).
Pupil data was interpolated linearly for blinks and tracking
losses (after artifact removal). For a similar procedure, see van
Rijn et al. (2012). To facilitate the comparison between partic-
ipants, pupillary data (measured in arbitrary units by the eye
tracker and converted to millimeters following the manufac-
turer’s instructions) was normalized by subtracting the individ-
ual participant’s baseline from every recorded diameter of that
participant. The baseline was calculated by averaging all pupil
diameter measurements during the time from t1 to t2 in all 92
trials.
In order to analyze gaze duration towards sacrificed and non-
sacrificed avatars, we used the entire left and right half of the
screen as areas of interest during the time period between the beep
sound and the key press. We chose these areas in order to include
any searches for additional clues surrounding the avatars in our
analysis and to account for any additional fixations that occurred
as a consequence of the fact that the avatars’ on-screen position
kept moving during presentation.
RESULTS
BEHAVIORAL RESULTS
During the experimental procedure participants were confronted
with four dilemma situations in which avatars differing in either
gender, ethnicity, body orientation, or number were present. In
conditions 1 to 3, only around 2% of the trials involving avatars
were invalid, due to a lack of reaction leading to a collision
with the trolley on the middle track. We considered these rare
trials as irrelevant and excluded them from further analysis. For
each experimental condition we were interested in how many
avatars of one group (e.g., males) were sacrificed compared to
the number of avatars of the other group (e.g., females). The
overall percentages across all 10 meaningful trials are summarized
in Table 1.
Group condition (hypotheses 1 and 2)
The most substantial effect was detected in the group dilemma
(condition 4). Here, participants decided in 96% of the cases to
sacrifice the single person in order to save the group, confirming
our first hypothesis. Both male and female participants showed
this clear pattern (see Figures 3G,H). Fifty-five of the 66 partici-
pants sacrificed the single person in all of the 10 trials and there
was only one participant who sacrificed the group in all trials. We
computed a three-way repeated measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-
Geisser applied) with gender (2 levels: male vs. female) and
music (2 levels: music on vs. music off) as between-subject
factors and trial (10 levels) as within-subject factor. No significant
main effects or interactions could be detected, all p ≥ 0.169,
η2 ≤ 0.02. The absence of a difference in the proportion of
sacrificed single persons between the music condition (95.3%)
and the silent condition (96.3%) contradicts hypothesis 2. A
difference in the participants’ satisfaction with their decision
between the music condition (M = 0.38, SD = 1.74) and the silent
condition (M = 0.34, SD = 1.88) was absent as well, t(64) = 0.09,
p = 0.931, d = 0.02. We created a composite score of negative
emotions by computing the mean across “annoyed”, “angry”,
“irritated” and “gross”. The difference between this score in the
music condition (M = 2.30, SD = 1.22) and the score in the
silent condition (M = 1.84, SD = 0.80) was significant by trend,
indicating a stronger negatively valenced mood in the group that
heard music, t(57) = 1.82, p = 0.074, d = 0.48. Also by trend,
participants in the music group were more delighted than those
participants in the control condition, t(63) = 1.97, p = 0.054,
d = 0.50.
The effect of gender, ethnicity, and body orientation in
one-against-one scenarios (hypotheses 3 to 7)
With respect to the gender condition (condition 1), our third
hypothesis regarding the female participants’ tendency towards
killing more male avatars at least in the first trial has not been
confirmed. Only 44% females sacrificed the male avatar in the
first trial, a ratio that is not significantly different from 50%,
t(33) = 0.68, p = 0.501, d = 0.12. Both genders sacrificed approx-
imately as many men as women during the first five trials in
the gender condition (see Figure 3A). Starting with the sixth
trial a tendency for sacrificing more men than women emerged.
This difference is most pronounced in trials 6 through 8. As can
be seen in Figure 3B, the tendency to sacrifice more men than
women in the later trials was especially due to the responses
of male participants. From trial 5 on, the percentage of men
who killed the male avatar remained constant at around 70%.
Female participants did not show such a univocal pattern. To
further investigate this pattern, we performed a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with gender of participant (2 levels: male vs.
female) as between-subject factor and trial number (10 levels)
as within-subject factor. It revealed a marginally significant main
effect of gender on the frequency of sacrificed men, F(1,52) = 3.07,
p = 0.086, η2 = 0.06. However, neither an effect of trial number
nor an interaction between the number of trial and participants’
gender was detected, all F(9,468) ≤ 0.91, p ≥ 0.521, η2 ≤ 0.02.
Subsequently, we decided to conduct comparisons based on the
averaged sacrificing tendencies across all trials. No clear difference
between male (62%) and female (55%) participant’s tendency to
sacrifice male avatars could be detected, t(64) = 1.48, p = 0.143,
d = 0.37. However, we were mainly interested in comparing the
responses with the assumed chance level of 0.5 derived from the
null hypothesis that people do not care which avatar they sacrifice.
Contradicting hypothesis 5, a one-sample t-test comparing the
number of sacrificed male avatars (58%) across all meaningful
trials with chance level (50%) revealed that significantly more
men were sacrificed than women, t(65) = 3.56, p = 0.001, d =
0.44. The deviation from 50% was particularly strong for male
participants, t(29) = 3.26, p = 0.003, d = 0.60, and less pronounced
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Table 1 | Percentages of sacrificed avatars for each experimental condition.
Condition All participants (n = 66) Female participants (n = 36) Male participants (n = 30)
% (SD) 95% CI % (SD) 95% CI % (SD) 95% CI
Gender: sacrificed males 58.28 (18.89) [53.64, 62.93] 55.16 (17.39) [49.28, 61.04] 62.03 (20.20) [54.48, 69.75]
Ethinicity: sacrificed whites 49.04 (15.23) [45.29, 52.78] 50.79 (17.13) [45.00, 56.99] 46.93 (12.55) [42.24, 51.61]
Body direction: sacrificed facing avatars 48.19 (27.99) [41.30, 55.07] 46.17 (28.36) [36.58, 55.77] 50.60 (27.84) [40.21, 61.00]
Group: sacrificed singles 95.67 (14.47) [92.20, 99.32] 96.11 (10.22) [92.65, 99.57] 95.33 (18.52) [88.42, 100.02]
Note. Percentages indicate how often the type of avatar mentioned in the first column was sacrificed. A value of 50% would reflect that both avatar types in the
respective comparison were sacrificed to an equal degree. Trials in which participants did not respond were excluded from analysis. CI = confidence interval.
for female participants, t(35) = 1.78, p = 0.084, d = 0.30. We
can summarize that there is a clear tendency to sacrifice male
individuals, but we yielded ambiguous results with respect to the
impact of the participant’s gender on the sacrificing decisions.
The repeated measures ANOVA and the comparison of the aver-
aged sacrifice tendencies with chance level hint at a tendency of
male participants to sacrifice more men as compared to female
participants. However, when we compare the average sacrificing
tendencies of male and female participants directly, the difference
does not reach significance.
Semantic Differential Scales in the questionnaire were used
to measure the attitudes of the participants towards women and
men. To compare the favorability of the participants’ attitudes
towards women and men, we performed a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA with gender of participant (2 levels: male vs.
female) as between-subject factor and gender of attitude object
(2 levels: male vs. female) as within-subject factor. Women (M =
1.51, SD = 0.99) were evaluated more favorably than men (M =
1.35, SD = 0.92), F(1,62) = 8.90, p = 0.004, η2 = 0.13. However, no
effect of participants’ gender could be detected, F(1,62) = 0.13, p =
0.719, η2 < 0.01.
We also compared the participants’ behavioral responses with
their tendency to present their behavior in terms of social desir-
ability (as measured by the SES-17). After identifying five outliers
(data points that were at least 1.5 interquartile ranges below or
above the first or third quartile, respectively, on at least one
dimension), we decided to calculate Spearman’s correlation statis-
tic, which is less sensitive to outliers than Pearson’s correlation
coefficient. Indeed, this led to a significant correlation, rs = 0.25,
p = 0.041, indicating that those individuals who scored high on
the SES tended to sacrifice the male avatars instead of female
ones. This is an example of how behavior in virtual worlds is
influenced by common social norms, underlining the validity of
VR experiments for social cognition research.
For the ethnicity and the body orientation condition (see
Figures 3C–F) we ran two separate two-way repeated measures
ANOVAs with gender of participant (2 levels: male vs. female) as
between-subject factor and meaningful trial number (10 levels)
as within-subject factor. All main effects and interactions proved
to be insignificant, except for a marginally significant interaction
between trial number and gender in the ethnicity condition,
F(9,459) = 1.75, p = 0.075, η2 < 0.03 (see Figure 3D). The sacri-
ficing tendencies in the ethnicity and body orientation conditions
were largely balanced. On average each participant sacrificed the
white avatars in 49% of the trials in the ethnicity condition, which
is not significantly different from 50%, t(65) = 0.51, p = 0.609,
d = 0.06. This confirms our hypothesis 6 according to which
participants would sacrifice the white and the dark skinned
avatar to an equal degree over the course of the condition. In
the first meaningful trial of this condition exactly 50% of the
participants who gave a valid response sacrificed the black avatar,
which contradicts our hypothesis 4, according to which at least
in the first trial participants would exhibit a tendency towards
sacrificing the dark skinned avatar. Also, body orientation had
no influence on participants’ decisions as indicated by the fact
that in 48% of the entire meaningful trials participants sacrificed
the avatar facing them, which is not considerably different from
50%, t(65) = 0.53, p = 0.600, d = 0.06. Thus, we did not find
support for hypothesis 7, according to which participants would
sacrifice more avatars facing away from them than those looking
at them.
Response time comparison (hypothesis 8)
Our hypothesis 8 stated that the response times in the group
dilemma will be fastest. Due to a software problem, the recorded
response times of some participants were longer than their
actual response times. The measuring error differed between
participants. We excluded response times above 2.5 s, which
was the maximum possible response time, from analysis. This
amounts to 6% of the data. Importantly, all results of the
reported statistical tests in this section would remain signifi-
cant when including this data. As predicted, a two-way repeated
measures ANOVA (Greenhouse-Geisser applied) including gen-
der (2 levels: male vs. female) as between-subject factor and
experimental condition (4 levels: gender condition, ethnicity
condition, body orientation condition, and group condition)
as within-subject factor reflected a main effect of experimental
condition on response time, F(2.22,135.57) = 19.88, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.25. An effect of gender was not present, F(1,61) = 0.27,
p = 0.604, η2 < 0.01. While we can make no safe statements
about absolute response times, we can, however, make compar-
isons between experimental conditions because this is a within-
subject factor. Bonferroni adjusted paired comparisons revealed
that the gender condition (M = 1.42, SD = 0.57), the eth-
nicity condition (M = 1.42, SD = 0.59) and the body orien-
tation condition (M = 1.35, SD = 0.57) differed significantly
from the group condition (M = 1.12, SD = 0.45) in mean
response time, all ps < 0.001, reflecting the fact that participants
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FIGURE 3 | Percentages of sacrificed avatar types as a function of
meaningful trials within condition. (A) Percentage of sacrificed men
across 10 meaningful trials in the gender condition. (B) Percentage of
sacrificed men across 10 meaningful trials in the gender condition
separated by participants’ gender. (C) Percentage of sacrificed whites
across 10 meaningful trials in the ethnicity condition. (D) Percentage of
sacrificed whites across 10 meaningful trials in the ethnicity condition
separated by participants’ gender. (E) Percentage of sacrificed avatars
facing towards the participant across 10 meaningful trials in the body
direction condition. (F) Percentage of sacrificed avatars facing towards
the participant across 10 meaningful trials in the body direction condition
separated by participants’ gender. (G) Percentage of sacrificed singles
across 10 meaningful trials in the group condition. (H) Percentage of
sacrificed singles across 10 meaningful trials in the group condition
separated by participants’ gender. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 8 | Article 426 | 9
Skulmowski et al. Forced-choice decision-making
responded fastest when confronted with the group dilemma.
This result suggests that simple utilitarian decisions can be made
faster.
EYE TRACKING RESULTS
Pupillary data (hypotheses 9 and 10)
For conditions 1–3, we were interested in whether there was
a significant change in pupil dilation over the course of trials
(hypothesis 9) and in whether there was a difference in pupil
dilation between and within the experimental conditions. As con-
dition 4 featured a slightly different task, a different environment,
different lighting conditions, and was always presented last, this
condition was analyzed separately.
For the analysis of pupil dilation during the decision process,
we considered only those trials that featured avatars. We focused
on the time span right after the onset of avatar presentation
(coinciding with the beep sound that marked the start of key-
board activation) until the screen was blacked out. The averaged
pupil dilations over time (see Figure 4) revealed a characteristic
pattern: after a mild decrease in pupil diameter, a global maxi-
mum follows which is then succeeded by a high degree of pupil
constriction.
For conditions 1 to 3, we selected three bins (as indicated by
the gray areas in Figure 4), each with a length of 200 ms, based
on the averaged minima and maxima at the described positions.
We performed a three-way repeated measures ANOVA with bin
(3 levels) as within-subject factor and conditions (3 levels: gender
condition, ethnicity condition, body orientation condition) and
gender of participant (2 levels: male vs. female) as between-
subject factors. We found a significant main effect of bin on pupil
diameter, F(2,78) = 165.99, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.81. All Bonferroni-
adjusted pairwise comparisons between bins were significant,
all p’s < 0.001. This result confirms our hypothesis 9. Apart
from this, no other main effects or interactions were found, all
p≥ 0.139, η2 ≤ 0.05. No effect of gender or condition was found.
It is striking that the response times in conditions 1 to 3 coincide
fairly well with the beginning increase in pupil diameter at around
1.4 s, indicating a high arousal.
With regards to the pupil dilation during condition 4, we tested
whether the music-induced arousal indicated by the increased
pupil diameter (see Figure 5) was significant (hypothesis 10). We
tested this with another three-way repeated measures ANOVA
(Greenhouse-Geisser applied) with bin (3 levels) as within-
subject factor and music condition (2 levels: music on vs.
music off) and gender (2 levels: male vs. female) as between-
subject factors. For this analysis, we chose different bins of
the same size matched with the minima and maxima of this
condition.
The bins included the 200 ms after the beep, the 200 ms around
the global maximum and the 200 ms around the global mini-
mum. Again, there was a main effect of bin, F(1.71,63.26) = 60.35,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.62. All Bonferroni-adjusted pairwise com-
parisons between bins were significant, all p ≤ 0.001. Also, we
found a main effect of music, F(1,37) = 6.67, p = 0.014, η2 = 0.15,
confirming hypothesis 10. There was no interaction between bin
and music, F(1.71,63.26) = 2.453, p = 0.102, η2 = 0.06, indicating
that the shape of the pupil dilation curve was similar for the music
and control conditions. The higher average pupil diameter in the
music condition shows that the irritating music did have an effect
on the participants’ arousal, while mixed self-reports (see above)
indicated no specific valence. No other significant main effects or
interactions were detected, all p ≥ 0.102, η2 ≤ 0.06.
Gaze duration for victims and non-victims (hypothesis 11)
We used the eye tracking data to measure the relative time
participants spent on looking at the side where the victim was
located compared to the time looking at the other side during
the decision process (the time period between the beep sound
and the key press). We calculated a score for conditions 1 to 3
by dividing the mean time looking at the side where the victim
was by the mean time looking at the other side. For this score,
a value of 1 reflects a balanced ratio, while a value above 1
indicates that the participant spent more time looking at the
side where the victim was located. We found a general tendency
across all conditions to spend more time looking at the avatar
that is to be sacrificed (M = 1.07, SD = 0.26), t(40) = 1.74,
p = 0.089, d = 0.27. Of all conditions, this effect was strongest
for the gender condition (M = 1.21, SD = 0.65), t(40) = 2.08,
p = 0.044, d = 0.32. However, for the ethnicity (M = 1.03,
SD = 0.31) and the body orientation (M = 1.07, SD = 0.34)
conditions this effect was not significant, p = 0.558 and p = 0.188,
respectively. This result implies that the gender dilemma, which
featured a particularly sensitive issue, led participants to focus
their attention on their victim. While existing research suggests
that people will avoid looking at their victims (hypothesis 11),
our results show that this gaze tendency is context-dependent.
For the group condition the conducted analysis was not feasible,
because the group of avatars was, viewed from the participant’s
perspective, always straight ahead, rather than on one side or the
other.
DISCUSSION
REPLICATION OF PREVIOUS RESULTS IN THE GROUP CONDITION
Our 96% rate of utilitarian decisions across the 10 trials in the
group dilemma confirms our hypothesis 1. As only one partici-
pant decided to sacrifice the group instead of the single avatar in
all trials (all other participants stated that they only sacrificed the
group accidentally by reacting too late), it is apparent that people
stick with their decision and do not change their minds when
being confronted with this situation repeatedly. The replication
of the result that people tend to make utilitarian choices in
trolley dilemma situations and the extension of this result to
repeated confrontations with the dilemma validates our paradigm
to present participants with moral dilemmas in fully dynamic
virtual environments.
RESPONSE TIMES AND EMOTIONAL AROUSAL
We found that the classical one-against-many scenario led to sig-
nificantly faster response times than the one-against-one dilem-
mas. In these dilemmas no utilitarian judgments were possi-
ble, i.e., subjects had to decide for one of two equally harmful
options. Apparently, judgment formation in the group dilemma
requires a stronger cognitive elaboration. Moreover, we found
evidence that the harsh music increased emotional arousal in the
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FIGURE 4 | Averaged relative pupil dilation during the presentation of
the avatars. Plotted separately for each condition (10 trials per participant)
and aligned to the onset of the presentation of the avatars at t = 0. Pupil
dilation is calculated as change relative to the baseline (0).
FIGURE 5 | Averaged relative pupil dilation during the presentation
of the avatars during condition 4. Plotted separately for the music
condition and control condition (10 trials per participant each)
and aligned to the onset of the presentation of the avatars
at t = 0. Pupil dilation is calculated as change relative to the
baseline (0).
context of the group dilemma. However, we did not find clear
evidence for a specific valence. Hence contradicting hypothesis
2, the music did not annoy the participants and did not alter
moral decisions. The latter is not surprising, considering that
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there was little overall variance in participants’ behavior in the
group condition. Interestingly, the physiological measure of pupil
diameter corresponds to participants’ subjective arousal, while
no behavioral change could be observed as a consequence of
this affective state. Apparently, the utilitarian action tendency
is too strong to be interfered by affective responses. Surpris-
ingly, we found an indication that participants in the music
condition might have felt also more delighted than those in the
silent condition. This can only be explained by the fact that
participants completed the manipulation check after the music
had stopped and were asked specifically which emotion they are
experiencing right now. Apparently, participants were relieved
after the music had terminated. We think it is quite plausible
to assume that a feeling of relief might accompany the negative
emotional effects of the music that are carried over from the actual
experiment.
THE MODE MODEL AND ITS ROLE IN GENDER AND ETHNICITY
CONTEXTS
Our expectations regarding the gender and ethnicity condition
were based on the MODE model by Fazio (1990). One of
these expectations was that the first trial of these two con-
ditions would reveal automatic attitude-to-behavior processes.
However, there was no such clear tendency in the initial trials.
A possible explanation for this is that participants actually have
equally positive attitudes towards both genders or both ethnic-
ities and consequently sacrifice these groups in equal amounts.
Another plausible explanation would be that the decision time
frame was too long to measure implicit attitudes and too short
to measure explicit attitudes in the first trial. In order to be
able to make clearer distinctions between implicit and explicit
processes, future experiments should investigate the effect of
varying the decision time frame. For our study, introducing
the one-to-one forced choice setting, we opted for a time
frame that is long enough for people to recognize the relevant
properties, but short enough to prevent controlled cognitive
processing.
The MODE model proposes two factors, opportunity and
motivation, as determinants of whether a decision is formed in
a deliberate or an automatic fashion. Since our participants were
confronted with the same dilemma situations numerous times
and people generally tend to express balanced views towards
outgroups on explicit measures in the case of gender and ethnicity,
we expected them to sacrifice these groups in a balanced manner
over the 10 trials (hypotheses 5 and 6). In the case of the ethnic-
ity condition this hypothesis was confirmed as the participants
sacrificed the avatars of the two kinds to an equal amount over
the 10 meaningful trials. However, in the gender condition we
observed a clear tendency towards sacrificing male rather than
female avatars which contradicts our hypothesis 5 but might still
be in line with the MODE model. We assume that participants
deliberately sacrificed the male avatars in favor of the female
avatars in the later trials because they were motivated to behave in
line with a societal norm according to which women have a prior
right to preserve physical integrity as compared to men. There is
some evidence supporting this interpretation: women were rated
more favorably than men in the test for explicit attitudes and,
most interestingly, those participants who had a higher tendency
to answer in terms of social desirability sacrificed more male
avatars. Although not as clearly, we found some indication that
the tendency to sacrifice male individuals was strongest for our
male participants. Such an effect might be due to a higher societal
pressure on men not to privilege men than on women not to
privilege their own group. These results are also in line with
the motivated tactician metaphor (Schwarz, 1998) that would
predict that participants change their behavior into a publicly
acceptable manner after becoming aware of the social expectation.
Similarly, the continuum model (Fiske et al., 1999) would assume
that participants only have the necessary cognitive resources and
time to perform re-categorizations and adjust their behavior to
social norms in the later trials of each condition. Interestingly, no
significant differences could be found in the ethnicity condition.
This may be due to the fact that social norm in this context is
to treat people of all ethnicities equally. Possibly, our sample may
have been more sensitized to social aspects of gender inequality.
We therefore suggest to carry out follow-up studies using more
diverse samples as well as to conduct this study in different
cultural settings.
BODY ORIENTATION
Regarding the body orientation condition, our hypothesis (H7)
has not been confirmed. Apparently, participants did not have
more scruples about sacrificing the avatar facing toward them,
possibly because they recognized that there was the same avatar
on both tracks. Some participants told us that they sacrificed
the avatar facing them since this avatar could see the train
approaching and leave the track, while the avatar facing away from
them did not have this chance. On the one hand, participants
did not want to drive towards the avatar looking right at them,
while on the other hand it is considered to be unfair to hurt
an avatar that is not aware of any danger. We must however
also acknowledge the possibility that these reports merely reflect
post hoc justifications.
PUPILLARY DATA
From pupillary data we can draw conclusions regarding the cog-
nitive load and emotional involvement in the dilemma situations.
In all four conditions, a significant increase in pupil diameter
occurred after the moment of decision, indicating participants’
increased arousal or cognitive load at that time. This result con-
firmed our hypothesis 9. Einhäuser et al. (2010) have shown that
pupil dilation is time-locked to moments of decision and that
pupil dilation is influenced by post-decisional consolidation of
the selected outcome rather than the cognitive appraisal compo-
nent before the decision.
When examining the pupil diameter elicited in the first three
conditions, an increase right after the moment of choice (average
response time around 1.4 s in conditions 1–3) stands out followed
by a high degree of constriction approximately 1 s after the
participants made their decisions. This decrease in pupil diameter
is more pronounced in conditions 1 to 3 compared to condition
4, however, since these conditions featured a slight change of
luminance (leaving a dark tunnel) starting at the time period we
analyzed, this extreme change in dilation needs to be interpreted
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with caution. However, as a similar pattern featuring a distinct
decrease of pupil diameter after the decision was also present
in the steadily illuminated environment of condition 4, we can
assume that the constriction in condition 1 to 3 was not just an
artifact of the change of luminance.
When comparing the conditions, condition 2 (ethnicity)
elicited the highest arousal on average, though the difference is not
significant (presumably due to the high variance between partic-
ipants). Nevertheless, we are convinced that emotional reactions
to more extreme social decision situations (particularly regard-
ing controversial topics) will prove to be fruitful psychological
research venues utilizing immersive VR technology. The increased
average pupil diameter in the music condition is in line with
our expectation (H10) according to which the noise would lead
to higher arousal. It is also in congruence with the higher self-
reported emotional arousal (mixed in valence) that we found in
the noise condition.
GAZE DURATION FOR VICTIMS AND NON-VICTIMS
We found a general tendency across all conditions to spend more
time looking at the avatar that will be killed. This tendency was
strongest in the gender condition. An eye tracking study that
utilized written vignettes and pictures of the scenario found that
people generally avoid looking at those individuals that they had
sacrificed in a moral dilemma (Kastner, 2010). In contrast to Kast-
ner’s study, which examined viewing behavior after a decision, we
focused on participants’ gaze during the decision process. Since
our participants did not avert their gaze from their victims and
even looked at their victims significantly longer in the gender
condition, hypothesis 11 was not confirmed. Our participants
may have directed their attention longer at the victim in order
to reassure themselves of making a “right” decision. This search
for reassurance or clues might be the reason why participants
looked longest at their victim in the socially sensitive gender
condition.
VALIDITY OF THE PRESENT STUDY AND OUTLOOK
In this study we have validated a new research method for studies
on moral cognition. Using a fully dynamic VR setup in a repeated
confrontation paradigm, we have replicated the findings of previ-
ous experiments employing the trolley dilemma in one-shot tex-
tual presentation designs. While we replicated the results of non-
VR studies, the use of VR offers several important advantages:
VR offers a high degree of immersion as a result of the dynamic
visual display that cannot be attained with written scenarios.
Decision time frames can be held constant in VR studies while
participants in pen-and-paper studies read scenario descriptions
at varying speed, making comparisons between their response
times impossible. Furthermore, we have shown that physiological
measurements such as pupillometry can be integrated into VR
study designs to measure arousal in addition to self-reports.
Additional measures such as heart rate or skin conductance are
possible. Our use of eye tracking as a measure for attention could
be expanded upon by using more fine-grained regions of interest
and by analyzing the temporal dynamics of gaze behavior as well
as the formation of established scan-paths over time (cf. Kaspar
et al., 2011). In future studies haptic input devices could be used
to include sensorimotor data in the VR interaction and to analyze
aspects of embodiment.
Since previous studies have found that immersion during
VR experiments is high and that responses elicited in these
experiments are comparable to those responses found in real-
world versions of the experiments (Slater et al., 2006; Rovira
et al., 2009), we can assume that our results mirror the behav-
ior that our participants would exhibit in a similar real-world
dilemma. In fact, also Patil et al. (2014) emphasized that tex-
tual scenario presentation does not include the manifold visual
information (but also temporal dynamics) which are accessi-
ble to people in real world and hence they cannot access the
context-dependent knowledge that is crucial for decision mak-
ing processes. By applying VR the sensory engagement becomes
significantly stronger and the informational scaffold for decision
making processes more realistic. Therefore, our study is pre-
sumably more ecologically valid than written or static pictorial
versions of the corresponding moral dilemmas. Although the
situation of steering a trolley and having to decide which person
to sacrifice is uncommon, participants immediately understood
the dilemma and put effort into their decisions. As already
mentioned, they did not perceive it to be an irrelevant video
game which makes it likely that their decisions in the virtual
environment reflect tendencies that would also be present in the
non-virtual world.
Nevertheless, there are also limitations present in our study.
First of all, the sensory engagement could be further increased by
including a visual representation of the train’s control unit and the
participant’s hand, to name just one example. Further limitations
concern the comparability to other studies. For instance, the
design of the modified trolley scenarios in conditions 1 to 3
does not allow a utilitarian judgment as the classical scenario
realized in condition 4, i.e., bringing about the best overall
consequences at the cost of the well-being of single individuals.
Instead, the moral aspect of these dilemmas is given by the
contrasted value assigned to man vs. woman (condition 1), black
vs. white person (condition 2), person facing you vs. not facing
you (condition 3). Therefore, all choices are equally harmful and
unfair on the face of it, considering that in each one person
is killed. This makes the study unusual in the field of moral
psychology and makes it hard to directly compare this study
with the original trolley dilemma. Furthermore, unlike previ-
ous VR studies in which participants could refrain from acting
(Navarrete et al., 2012; Patil et al., 2014), our participants were
forced to make a choice in the one-to-one dilemmas. Forcing
participants to kill repeatedly might lead to reduced feelings
of responsibility, which in turn might lead to random choices
resulting in non-significant results. We have tried to prevent this
by introducing filler trials and by varying the dilemma contents
throughout the experiment, but cannot completely rule out this
possibility.
However, we are convinced that the one-against-one dilemma
provides novel important insights into processes of moral judg-
ments as the decision cannot be made simply on the basis of
the number of people that would die or can be rescued. Rather
this forced-choice situation brings a social comparison into play
that refers to different key features of the target person (i.e.,
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gender, ethnicity, and bodily orientation). As a utilitarian judg-
ment is impossible, the dilemmas provoke a decision on the
basis of only one salient feature in which the target persons
differ. The results show that in general significantly more men
were sacrificed than women but that ethnicity and bodily ori-
entation did not affect the decisions. Apparently, some person
characteristics elicit a judgment bias while others are not con-
sidered (or are consciously counteracted). These findings provide
interesting starting points for future research that is necessary
to scrutinize the generalizability of the results to other person
characteristics.
A further limitation consists, however, in the use of a sample
composed of exclusively German university students of white
ethnic origin. People from other cultural, ethnic, or educational
backgrounds as well as from other age groups may show different
reactions. Regarding the external validity, we can therefore only
assume that a similar sample will show comparable responses,
underlining the importance of cross-cultural follow-up studies
using forced-choice dilemmas. As has already been shown, moral
judgments can vary greatly between people of different cultural or
societal background (Haidt et al., 1993). Another important issue
is the chosen length of the decision time frame. Previous studies
used very short presentation times of ∼200 ms of large static
visual stimuli to study implicit attitudes (Payne, 2001; Amodio
et al., 2008), which allows for response intervals of less than
500 ms. The decision time we employed might be too long in
order to find implicit biases, explaining the lack of significant
results in the racism condition and the first few trials in the gender
condition. Paradigms like the IAT are superior to detect racial
biases because they require a much faster response. In contrast,
in this study response times could range up to 2500 ms. The
crucial question is whether subjects had enough time to control
their initial response biases in favor of a more deliberate decision
formation when presented with a particular dilemma for the
first time. We argue that this is likely not the case since the
time needed to perceive the scene correctly in the here presented
dilemmas is much longer. The reason for this is the nature and
complexity of the dynamic stimulus used. First, the size of the
visual targets was small, i.e., mainly the faces of the persons, which
requires saccadic eye movements to each of the targets to perceive
the relevant information. Intersaccadic intervals (including the
fixation period) are ∼350 on average with a very large fraction
even longer than 500 ms (Otero-Millan et al., 2008; Dorr et al.,
2010). Therefore, a required active exploration of the VR, with
one saccade on each target, is expected to last at least 700 ms to
more than a second. Hence, the time needed for perception per se
is much longer than the reported response times of 500 ms that
were used in previous studies using static images to investigate
fast implicit attitudes. Second, the relevant information in the
visual stimuli used there had been rather global, i.e., a white vs.
a black face can be decoded purely on the average luminance.
This in contrast to the rather small informative patches, i.e.,
essentially the face of the persons, in this paradigm makes visual
processing faster. Lastly, we used fog to allow for a smooth
appearance of the visual targets, which led to an ambiguity that
slowly faded while the fog lifted, allowing for increased visibility
of the relevant targets’ features. This process was taken place
on the order of seconds as well. Taken all three effects together,
a time needed for pure perception of the scene on the order
of 1–2 s is plausible and is experimentally supported by our
pre-tests which have shown that people were unable to reliably
detect the relevant avatar features when applying shorter decision
windows. In conclusion, it appears unlikely that subjects had
enough time to control for implicit biases since most of the
2500 ms decision windows were needed for perceptional processes
identifying relevant features. Nevertheless, future research using
this paradigm should be done varying the decision time frame
to investigate whether this has an effect on behavior. It is to
expect that the influence of explicit attitudes increases when
participants have more time to deliberate. Patil et al. (2014)
have chosen a longer decision time frame (10 s), while we were
interested in quick, automatic judgments. Especially for our gen-
der condition, a variation of decision time frames could lead to
interesting results regarding the interplay between implicit and
explicit attitudes.
Finally, a similar VR setting could be used for research on
physiological effects of dilemma situations and uncertainty of
decisions, e.g., by combining this setup with EEG recordings.
Future studies on the interplay between cognitive and affec-
tive factors in moral decisions could also focus on more per-
sonally involving moral dilemmas that involve physical contact
with avatars, possibly implemented by using motion-tracked
dummies. Pupillometric studies could focus on differences in
the experience of agency on pupil dilation, e.g., by comparing
the pupil dilation in our study design with a less immedi-
ate mode of interaction, such as only being a bystander at a
switch.
CONCLUSION
Our VR study confirmed that decisions in dilemma situations
can be explained within the framework of dual-process theories
such as Greene’s or the MODE model. We were able to replicate
the results of previous research on the trolley problem, thereby
validating our research method. Additionally, our forced-choice
dilemma revealed a general tendency towards sacrificing male
individuals, which was associated with socially desirable respond-
ing. As indicated by differences in response times, decisions
regarding the group dilemma seem to be faster to decide than
those based on comparisons of avatar properties such as gender,
ethnic origin, or body orientation, since they are based on dif-
ferent moral contents. Furthermore, we were able to manipulate
emotion on a subjective and physiological level during decision
tasks using music. The specific signature of pupil dilation featur-
ing a peak around the moment of decision is independent of the
baseline arousal level.
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